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The Benefits of Competition
Competition has long been recognized as a necessary ingredient of our economic system. Competition, it is argued, is
needed to combat the negative effects of monopoly. Downs describes the negative effects of monopoly and the benefits of competition in these terms:
The classic antidote to monopoly is competition. By introducing
alternative sources of supply, competition expands the choice available to consumers. Moreover, these alternative sources are likely
to use different methods and approaches, or even to develop wholly
new products, thus greater variety makes expanded choice really
meaningful. Since consumers can shift their trade from suppliers
who do not please them, suppliers have a strong incentive to provide what the consumers want. This attitude also means competitors regard innovations positively, as potential means of winning
more business ... In contrast, monopolists usually view innovations negatively (Downs, 1970, p. 264).
A number of authors have criticized government's historic
monopoly of human services delivery in this country. These
critics maintain that government monopoly has led to a human
services delivery system that is inefficient, ineffective, unresponsive, and in some cases irrelevant, to the real needs of clients
and communities (Drucker, 1969; Reid, 1972; Pruger and Miller,
1973; Savas, 1977, 1982). What is needed, in the view of these
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authors, is for government to promote competition in human
services delivery. The anticipated benefits of promoting competition in human services delivery are said to be numerous:
promotion of innovative and creative approaches to service delivery (Newman and Turem, 1974), improved service quality
(Fitch, 1974), and the creation of a pricing mechanism (Fisk,
Kiesling, and Muller, 1978), that can lead to lower service delivery costs (Kettner and Martin, 1985).
Competition & Purchase of Service Contracting (POSC)
The two principal methods of promoting competition in human services delivery are the use of vouchers and purchase of
service contracting (Bendick, 1984). Vouchers have been used
for some time in such service areas as education, day care and
transporation services (Hatry and Valente, 1983; Agranoff and
Pattakos, 1985; Hatry and Durman, 1985). Purchase of service
contracting (POSC) has also been used as a means of promoting
competition in the human services (Kettner and Martin, 1985;
Hatry and Durman, 1985). By making public funds available
through POSC, the expectation is that private sector service providers will compete with one another to win human services
contracts.
Of the two principal methods available, POSC dearly holds
the greatest potential for generating competition in human services delivery. The federal Department of Health and Human
Services, all fifty state human services agencies, and a sizable
proportion of municipal and county human services agencies all
use POSC (Mueller, 1980, Martin, 1986, Agranoff and Pattakos,
1985). POSC has been the major mode of state human services
delivery since the late 1970's (Benton, Field, and Millar, 1978;
Mueller, 1980; Martin, 1986; Kettner and Martin, 1987). Based
on studies of state human services agencies, it is estimated that
POSC expenditures under the federal Social Service Block Grant
program alone exceed $1 billion dollars annually (Mueller, 1980,
Martin 1986, Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Despite its potential importance as a means of promoting
competition in the human services, little is actually known about
the real extent of competition in POSC. From a theoretical perspective general agreement exists that most types of human ser-
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vices are at least candidates for competitive contracting (Hatry
and Durman, 1985). From an empirical perspective, however,
most of what is known about competition in POSC for human
services is derived from a limited knowledge base that is perhaps best characterized as being of a case study or anecdotal
nature (e.g., Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., 1980;
Terrell and Kramer, 1984; Hatry and Durman, 1985; DeHoog,
1985, 1986; Kramer and Grossman, 1987). The evidence that does
exist, however, suggests that competition in POSC for human
services may be more myth than reality. If competition is generally absent in human services contracting, a disturbing question is raised in some minds: has the widespread use of POSC
created situations where private sector monopolies have simply
replaced public sector monopolies? (Florestano, 1982).
In an attempt to determine the extent of competition in POSC
for human services and the factors that may promote, or impede
it, the authors conducted a secondary data analysis of a recent
national survey of the POSC activities of state Social Services
Block Grant (SSBG) agencies (Martin, 1986).
Study Design
The original study conducted in 1986, involved a mail survey
sent to the top administrators of the fifty state SSBG agencies.
Forty-three state SSBG administrators responded to the survey
as the result of the original and one follow-up mailing constituting a response rate of 86%. Specific questions were asked
concerning: (a) the extent of competition present in the POSC
activities of state SSBG agencies; (b) the criteria, or factors, used
in making decisions about POSC; and (c) the types of POSC
administrative mechanisms most frequently used by state SSBG
agencies. The variables used to operationalize these concepts are
discussed in the following sections.
Competition
Competition was defined as two or more contractors submitting bids or proposals to provide a service. This is a fairly
standard test for the presence of competition in contracting and
is based on government procurement theory (Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, 1979; DeHoog, 1985; Kettner and Martin,
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1985, 1987). In an attempt to determine the extent of competition
experienced in each state, SSBG administrators were asked to
indicate the percentage of time two or more bids or proposals
were received in response to the issuance of invitations for bids
(IFBs) and requests for proposals (RFPs). Because the effort necessary for precise calculations would have made responses impractical, state SSBG administrators were asked to make their
best, and most informed, percentage estimates.
POSC Decision Factors
Beginning in the late 1960s a series of studies was conducted
in an attempt to identify the criteria, or factors, used by state
human services agencies in making decisions about the use of
POSC. The question posed in these studies, in short, was: what
factors were most important in your state's overall decisions to
use POSC? (Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 1969; Wedel, 1974; Benton, Field and Millar, 1978; Pacific Consultants, 1979; American
Public Welfare Association, 1981). The findings of these studies
were distilled into eleven POSC decision factors: (1) cost considerations-the use of POSC to control, contain, or reduce the
cost of service delivery; (2) service system considerations-the
use of POSC to maintain or expand the human services system
through increased involvement of the private sector; (3) funding
considerations-the use of POSC to integrate federal and state
funding with local government and private sector funding;
(4) productivity considerations-the use of POSC to increase the
amount of services delivered; (5) availability and capability of
contractors-the effect that the presence or absence of multiple
capable potential contractors has on the ability to use POSC;
(6) service considerations-the nature of the services to be provided that might make POSC a more, or less, useful option;
(7) client considerations-the use of POSC to enhance client access or increase service impact; (8) government organizational
and policy considerations-the extent to which POSC is favored
by agency policy or necessitated by the lack of government expertise or equipment; (9) history and tradition-the influence
of established public-private sector relationships on the use of
POSC; (10) legal requirements-the influence of state laws and
regulations governing the use of POSC; (11) politics and com-
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munity pressures-the effects of power on decisions to use
POSC.
State SSBG administrators were asked to rate, using a six
point scale, the relative influence of each of these eleven factors
on their agencies' overall decisions to use POSC. A score of six
was used to indicate that the POSC decision factor was considered "very important" in the contracting decisions of the state
SSBG agency and a score of one was used to indicate that the
POSC decision factor was considered "not at all important." By
determining the relative priority state SSBG agencies place on
these various POSC decision factors, it is possible to explore
potential relationships between these factors and competition
levels.
Based on the findings of the five studies cited earlier and
other relevant literature dealing with POSC and contracting, it
was hypothesized that four of the identified POSC decision factors would be positively associated with competition levels and
seven negatively associated. The POSC decision factors hypothesized to be positively associated with competition levels are:
cost considerations, productivity considerations, availability and
capability of contractors, and legal requirements. Cost and productivity considerations are hypothesized to be positively associated with competition levels because increased competition
in human services delivery is generally viewed as a method to
drive down service delivery costs, increase productivity, or both
(Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1979; The Council on State
Governments, 1983; Hatry and Durman 1985). The availability
and capability of contractors (i.e., potential contractors) is generally considered to be the sine qua non of competition (Hatry
and Durman, 1985; Kettner and Martin, 1987). Legal requirements generally fall within the context of state procurement laws
and regulations, which tend to promote competitive contracting
(The Council of State Governments, 1983).
The seven POSC decision factors hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition levels are: service system considerations, funding considerations, service considerations, client
considerations, government organizational and policy considerations, history and tradition, and politics and community pressures. Service system considerations and funding considerations
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are hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition
levels because evidence suggests that when these factors are
important in POSC decisions, maintenance of the status quo
rather than any attempt to increase competition tends to be the
result (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc.; DeHoog, 1985,
1986). Likewise, when service considerations or client considerations are considered more important in POSC decisions,
competition tends to be less important (Hatry and Durman,
1984; Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Government organizational and policy considerations are
hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition levels
because where state human services agencies have a formal policy position on POSC, the policy tends to be collaborative, rather
than competitive (e.g., State of Connecticut, 1984). When government lacks the necessary expertise to provide a service directly, it also is frequently less well equipped administratively
to contract competitively for that service (Kettner and Martin,
1987).
History and tradition tend to promote collaboration rather
than competition in POSC because established public-private
sector relations were based on partnership arrangements rather
than competitive arrangements (Kettner and Martin, 1986). Finally, where politics and community pressures are brought to
bear on POSC decisions, these pressures are related to the funding of particular services or agencies, rather than to the promotion of competition (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
Inc., 1980: DeHoog, 1985).
If the hypotheses formulated above about the relationships
between POSC decision factors and competition hold true for
state SSBG agencies, an analysis of the study data should reveal
positive and negative correlations as follows:
Prediction of Positive
Correlationwith
Competition Levels
" Cost Considerations
"Productivity Considerations
* Availability & Capability
of Contractors
* Legal Requirements

Prediction of Negative
Correlation With
Competition Levels
- Service System
Considerations
* Funding Considerations
• Service Considerations
* Client Considerations
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" Government Organizational
& Policy Considerations
" History & Tradition
" Politics & Community
Pressures

POSC Administrative Mechanisms
Based on a review of the POSC and government procurement
literature, eight administrative mechanisms used by government
contracting agencies were also identified. These POSC administrative mechanisms include: the procurement processes of
(a) invitation for bids (IFBs) and (b) the request for proposals
(RFPs); the contract payment mechanisms of (c) cost reimbursement contracts and (d) unit cost, fixed-fee, and incentive contracts; the length of contract term either (e) single year contracts
or (f) multi-year contracts; and the type of contractors used
(g) government and non-profit contractors and (h) for-profit
contractors.
State SSBG administrators were again asked to rate, using
a six point scale, how characteristic each of the eight POSC administrative mechanisms was of their agency's overall approach
to POSC. A score of six was to indicate that the POSC administrative mechanism was considered "very characteristic" of the
state SSBG agency's contracting approach and a score of one was
to indicate that the POSC administrative mechanism was "not
at all characteristic."
In examining these eight POSC administrative mechanisms,
one can again hypothesize that some would be positively associated with competition levels and some negatively. The use
of the invitation for bids (IFBs) is generally associated with a
more competitive environment because price or cost is the primary decision criterion, with the resulting contract usually being
awarded to the lowest bidder (Office of Federal Procurement
Policy, 1979). The use of the request for proposals (RFPs), on the
other hand, is frequently associated with a less competitive environment because program design and service issues tend to
take precedence over issues of cost or price (The Council of State
Governments, 1983; Hatry and Durman, 1985).
Unit cost, fixed-fee, and incentive contracts are generally
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held to promote competition because contractors know they will
be paid a predetermined price for their services and, consequently, they are ultimately responsible for cost control and productivity. Conversely, the use of cost reimbursement contracts
is generally associated with a less competitive environment because contractors know that this type of payment mechanism
holds them harmless from financial risk since the government
contracting agency agrees to defray all the contractor's costs of
service delivery (Kettner and Martin, 1987).
The use of single year contracts is generally considered to
have a positive effect on competition because contractors can
change annually (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978; Hatry and
Durman, 1985). Thus, single year contracts tend to promote competition more than do multi-year contracts. The use of for-profit
contractors is also generally considered to promote competition
because in a competitive environment, it is likely that every
available type of contractor would be given an equal opportunity to compete. Excluding for-profits from being POSC contractors, as some state human services agencies apparently do
(State of Connecticut, 1984), and restricting POSC contracts to
only government and non-profit agencies is, therefore, considered as more characteristic of a less competitive environment.
If these generally held notions about the relationships between POSC decision factors and competition are consistent with
the actual practices of state SSBG agencies, an analysis of the
study data should reveal positive and negative correlations as
follows:
Prediction of Positive
Correlationwith
Competition Levels
" Invitation for Bids
" Unit Cost, Fixed-Fee &
Incentive Contracts
" Single Year Contracts
" For-Profit

Prediction of Negative
Correlation with
Competition Levels
- Request for Proposals
• Cost Reimbursement
Contracts
* Multi-Year Contracts
• Government & Non-Profit
Contractors

Study Findings
Extent of Competition
As Table 1 illustrates, nationally competition is present less
than 25% of the time in the POSC activities of the responding
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Table 1
Mean PercentageCompetition Levels Nationally and By
Geographical Region

Nationally
(40)

North
East
Region
(7)

27.7%
23.9%
of
) = Number Cases
*p=.05

North
Central
Region

South
Region

West
Region

(7)

(14)

(12)

11.6%

11.6%

43.3%

F-Test
3.165*

state SSBG agencies. This finding certainly calls into question
the notion that competition in POSC is a widespread national
phenomenon. There are, however, significant regional differences in the amount of competition present in the POSC activities of state SSBG agencies. Again referring to Table 1,
competition occurs 43% of the time in the West region, while
competition levels approximate the national average in the North
East region (27.7%) and are considerably below the national average in the North Central (11.6%) and South (11.66%) regions.
These four regional groupings were developed by the International City Management Association and have been used in previous studies involving POSC (Agranoff and Pattakos, 1985;
Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Competition and POSC Decision Factors
As Table 2 illustrates, none of the POSC decision factors are
significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, with
competition levels. At this point we might well conclude that
either: (a) the priorities of state SSBG agencies have no impact
on competition levels-that stated priorities to reduce costs or
increase productivity simply do not get translated in action, or
(b) that the degree of competition may be influenced more by
other factors and less by the conscious policy choices of state
SSBG agencies. When the focus of the analysis of Table 2 shifts
seven
from the size of the correlations to their signs, however,
of eleven signs are in the predicted direction. Five of the seven
POSC decision factors predicted to correlate negatively with
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Table 2
Predictedand Actual CorrelationsBetween POSC Decision Factorsand
Competition Levels
POSC Decision Factors
Cost Considerations
Productivity Considerations
Availability &Capability
of Contractors
Legal Requirements
Service System Considerations
Funding Considerations
Service Considerations
Client Considerations
Government Organizational
&Policy Considerations
History & Tradition
Politics & Community Pressures

Predicted
Correlation

Actual
Correlation

Positive
Positive

-. 06
.07

Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative

-. 19
.23
-. 03
-. 21
-. 07
.17

Negative
Negative
Negative

-. 22
-. 01
.08

competition levels have negative signs: service system considerations, service considerations, funding considerations, government organizational and policy considerations, and history and
tradition. Two of the four POSC decision factors predicted to
correlate positively with competition levels have positive signs:
productivity considerations and legal requirements. These findings provide at least some support for the notion that POSC
decision factors may be related to competition, but obviously
more precise measurements are needed to further probe the nature of these relationships.
If POSC decision factors do not explain the variation in competition between state SSBG agencies, the next most probable
source would be POSC administrative mechanisms.
Competition and POSC Administrative Mechanisms
Table 3 reveals a number of statistically significant correlations between POSC administrative mechanisms and competition levels, but few are in the direction predicted. In terms of
procurement mechanisms, both the invitation for bids (.35) and
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Table 3
Predictedand Actual CorrelationBetween POSC Administrative
Mechanism and Competition Levels
POSC Administrative Mechanism
Invitation for Bids (IFBs)
Request for Proposals (RFPs)
Unit Cost, Fixed-Fee &
Incentive Contracts
Cost Reimbursement Contracts
Single Year Contracts
Multi-Year Contracts
Government & Non-Profit
Contractors
For-Profit Contractors
*p =.05

**p =.01

Predicted
Correlation

Actual
Correlation

Positive
Negative

.35*
.27*

Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

.01
.01
-. 30*
.58* * *

Negative
Positive

-. 34*
.26*

***p =.001

the request for proposals (.27) are positively correlated with
competition levels indicating that these two POSC administrative mechanisms are characteristic of state SSBG agencies with
high competition levels. The contract payment mechanisms show
no correlations whatsoever, with both unit cost, fixed-fee, and
incentive contracts (.01) as well as cost reimbursement contracts
(.01) having zero order correlations.
Type of contractor variables do reveal signs in the predicted
directions, but the correlations are moderate. Government and
non-profit contractors show a moderate negative correlations
(-.34) with competition levels, while for-profit contractors demonstrate a moderate positive correlation (.26).
The length of contract term variables show moderate to strong
correlations, but their signs are in the opposite directions from
those predicted. Single-year contracts reveal a moderate negative
correlation (-.30) with competition levels, while multi-year contracts evidence a strong positive correlation (.58). These two
findings are surprising in that they run counter to generally
accepted notions that multi-year contracts retard competition
and single year contracts promote competition (Fisk, Kiesling,
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and Muller, 1974; Hatry and Durman, 1985; Kettner and Martin,
1985, 1987). A plausible explanation for this finding is that prospective contractors may be more willing to compete for POSC
contracts when they know that success will mean a long term
multi-year contractual relationship as opposed to a short term
single year contractual relationship.
Summary & Conclusions
What, then, can be said of competition and purchase of service contracting (POSC) based on these findings? First, that
competition does exist in the POSC activities of state SSBG
agencies, but less than 25% of the time. Second, that competition levels vary significantly between regions of the country
with the most competition taking place in the West region. Third,
that the policy priorities of state SSBG agencies, as operationalized in the selected POSC decision factors used in this study,
apparently have little effect on competition levels. Fourth, that
the different POSC administrative mechanisms used by state
SSBG agencies appear to have the greatest effect on competition
levels. Of the eight POSC administrative mechanisms included
in this study the most important in terms of promoting competition levels are: multi-year contracts, invitation for bids, request for proposals, and for-profit contractors.
While this study opens up for discussion the question of
competion in POSC and, by extension, competition in human
services delivery, a large number of important questions remain
for subsequent research. Most notable among these are: (a) do
state SSBG agencies see competiton as desirable or undesirable?
(b) are state SSBG agencies attempting to promote or reduce
competition? (c) what benefits do state SSBG agencies perceive
as resulting from increased or decreased competition? and
(d) what has been the impact of competition on the cost and
quality of service delivery so far? At this point, in the absence
of answers to these questions, it is too early to speculate on the
success or failure of competition in POSC or competition in
human services delivery.
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